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Abstract
This paper examines the interplay of the financing and hedging decisions of a risk-averse multi-
national firm having a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary. Exchange rate risk management of the
multinational firm is shown to have direct impacts on its international capital structure decision and
on its currency of denomination decision. If a currency forward market exists, the multinational firm
will devise its international capital structure so as to minimize the global weighted average cost of
capital. Or else the multinational firm has to rely on a money market hedge through issuing more
foreign currency denominated debt and less domestic currency denominated debt, thereby resulting
in a higher global weighted average cost of capital.
One of the major questions raised by multinational firms is how multiple currencies affect
their capital structure choices (Hodder and Senbet, 1990; Giddy, 1994). Shapiro (1984) and
Rhee, Chang, and Koveos (1985) refer to this question as the currency of denomination de-
cision for debt financing. As documented by Keloharju and Niskanen (1997), multinational
firms with exports constituting a significant fraction of turnover are most likely to raise
foreign currency denominated debt, implying a strong hedging motive behind the currency
of determination decision for debt financing.
The capital structure decision in an international setting may involve a rather compli-
cated flow of funds between parent firms and foreign subsidiaries. For example, a foreign
subsidiary may be funded by its retained earnings, by intra-firm debt or equity transfers
from its parent, or by local borrowing. Similarly, a parent may be funded by its retained
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earnings, by new share issues, or by debt. To address the international capital structure
decision in general and the currency of determination decision in particular, we present a
single-period model of a multinational firm having a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary and
facing exchange rate uncertainty. The model is enriched with the choice of currency for
debt being an integral part of exchange rate risk management.
If the multinational firm is privately held and owner-managed, it is reasonable to assume
risk-averse behavior. Even in the case that the multinational firm is publicly listed, manage-
rial risk aversion (Stulz, 1984), corporate taxes (Smith and Stulz, 1985), costs of financial
distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985), and capital market imperfections (Stulz, 1990; and Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993) all imply a concave objective function for the multinational
firm. Thus, we use risk aversion as an approximation for these imperfections.
The results of this paper show how exchange rate movements, multiple tax jurisdictions,
segmented capital markets, and currency forward markets jointly determine the optimal in-
ternational capital structure and the best mix of currencies. If the risk-averse multinational
firm has access to an unbiased currency forward market, we show that the firm will choose
its international capital structure to minimize the global weighted average cost of capital.
In this case, neither the attitude towards risk of the firm nor the incidence of exchange rate
uncertainty play a role in determining the optimal mix of financing of the firm. In contrast,
if the firm has no access to the currency forward market, we show that the firm has to
rely on a money market hedge via issuing more foreign currency denominated debt and less
domestic currency denominated debt. This hedging strategy results in a distortion that the
global weighted average cost of capital exceeds the minimum level.
Elliott, Huffman, and Makar (2003) and Nguyen and Faff (2004) document that foreign
currency denominated debt and foreign currency derivatives appear to be substitutes in
hedging foreign currency risk for US multinational corporations and for Australian firms,
respectively. Our model thus offers a theoretical rationale for their empirical findings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first develop a single-period model of
a risk-averse multinational firm under exchange rate uncertainty. In Section 2, we charac-
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terize the multinational firm’s optimal hedging decision when an unbiased currency forward
market exists. Section 3 derives the firm’s optimal international capital structure decision
when the optimal currency forward hedge is in place. Section 4 examines the implications
of exchange rate risk management on the international capital structure decision and on
the currency of denomination decision. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
1. The model
Consider a risk-averse multinational firm that makes decisions in a single-period horizon
with two dates, indexed by t = 0 and 1. The parent firm, domiciled in the home country,
has a wholly-owned subsidiary located in a foreign country. At date 0, the parent requires a
fixed investment, Ip, to generate a positive net end-of-period cash flow, Xp, where Ip and Xp
are denominated in the domestic currency and Xp > Ip. Likewise, the subsidiary requires
a fixed investment, Is, to generate a positive net end-of-period cash flow, Xs, where Is and
Xs are denominated in the foreign currency and Xs > Is.
Let et be the spot exchange rate of the domestic currency against the foreign currency at
date t. At date 0, e0 is revealed while e˜1 is a positive random variable distributed according
to a known probability density function.1 For simplicity, we assume that the spot exchange
rate follows a random walk in that e0 is the best predictor of e˜1. That is, we set e0 equal
to the expected value of e˜1.2
To finance the required investment, Is, the subsidiary relies on equity transfers from
the parent, Es, and debt issuance in the foreign capital market, Ds, yielding the following
balance sheet:
Is = Es +Ds. (1)
1Throughout the paper, a tilde (∼) always signifies a random variable.
2This assumption, albeit inessential for our qualitative results, has strong theoretical and empirical jus-
tification (see Rogalski and Vinso, 1977; Roll, 1977; Meese and Rogoff, 1983; and Broll and Wong, 2002),
especially over short horizons.
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The parent, on the other hand, raises the total funds needed, Ip+e0Es, by issuing debt, Dp,
and equity, Ep, in the domestic capital market. The balance sheet of the parent is therefore
given by
Ip + e0Es = Ep +Dp. (2)
Substituting equation (1) into equation (2) yields the consolidated global balance sheet of
the multinational firm:
Ip + e0Is = Dp + e0Ds + Ep. (3)
Hereafter, we denote K = Ip+ e0Is as the total investment made by the multinational firm
in units of the domestic currency.
We assume that the domestic and foreign capital markets are segmented. This assump-
tion is critical to the effect of the change in domestic for foreign debt on the multinational
firm’s cost of capital. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) empirically study the capital struc-
ture decision of foreign affiliates of US multinationals. They find that subsidiaries do alter
the level and composition of debt in response to tax differences across countries, and that
creditor rights and the development of the capital markets influence the capital structure
choice. These results seem to support our assumption that capital markets are somewhat
segmented.
Interest costs of debt, be they denominated in the domestic currency or in the foreign
currency, are assumed to comprise default risk premia that are positively related to debt-
equity ratios. Due to a lack of bargaining power, the subsidiary is confronted with a
pre-specified interest rate schedule, rs(λs), where λs = Ds/Es is the debt-equity ratio of
the subsidiary. The parent, also lacking in bargaining power, faces a pre-specified interest
rate schedule, rp(λp), where λp = (Dp+ e0Ds)/Ep is the global debt-equity ratio, reflecting
the fact that the subsidiary is wholly-owned by the parent. We assume that rp and rs are
twice continuously differentiable functions that are strictly increasing and weakly convex.3
3This assumption is consistent with the static trade-off theory of capital structure. See, e.g., Kraus and
Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), Brealey and Myers (2004), and Ross, Westerfield, and Jordon (2004).
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Interest costs of debt are fully tax-deductible in the home and foreign countries.
At date 1, the subsidiary has to pay corporate income taxes to the foreign government at
a constant tax rate, ts. The after-tax earnings, net of the debt repayments, of the subsidiary
are given by
Ys = Xs − ts(Xs − rsDs)− (1 + rs)Ds. (4)
The subsidiary repatriates the entire amount of Ys to the parent through a liquidating
dividend.
Since the dividend received from the subsidiary is denominated in the foreign currency,
the parent is inevitably subject to exchange rate risk. To hedge its risk exposure, the
parent sells H units of the foreign currency forward in a currency forward market. Since
we are interested in the economic implications of exchange rate risk management on the
international capital structure decision and the currency of denomination decision, it suffices
to restrict our attention to the case where the currency forward market is unbiased. Given
the random walk model of the spot exchange rate, the unbiasedness of the currency forward
market is tantamount to setting the forward exchange rate equal to e0.
At date 1, the parent has to pay corporate income taxes on both domestic and foreign
source income to the home government at a constant tax rate, tp. The tax system in the
home country, similar to that in the United States, allows credits for foreign taxes paid
directly on income as it is received by the parent (direct credits) and for foreign income
taxes paid on the income out of which a distribution is made to the parent (deemed paid
or indirect credits).4 The amount of credits available on dividend remittances is limited
to the home country tax liability on foreign source income. Firms are in excess credits if
foreign tax payments exceed the limitation. Otherwise, firms for which the limitation is not
binding receive full credits for taxes paid abroad and are said to be in excess limitation or
deficit credits.
Let δ be the value of one dollar of dividend repatriations after home and foreign country
4For more details about foreign tax credits, see Hartman (1985), Scholes and Wolfson (1992), Altshuler
and Fulghieri (1994), and Chowdhry and Coval (1998).
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taxes. Firms in excess credits pay no home country taxes on dividend repatriations so that
one dollar of dividends is subject only to withholding taxes at a constant rate, tw , paid to
the foreign country, resulting in δ = 1 − tw . In contrast, firms in excess limitation must
pay home country taxes on grossed up dividend repatriations but receives full credits on
withholding taxes, thereby yielding δ = (1− tp)/(1− ts).
The after-tax earnings, net of the debt repayments, of the parent are given by
Y˜p = Xp + (e0 − e˜1)H + δe˜1Ys − tp[Xp + (e0 − e˜1)H − rpDp]− (1 + rp)Dp. (5)
The parent pays out the entire amount of Yp to the shareholders as a liquidating dividend.
Shareholders of the parent have initial wealth, W0, upon which Ep is contributed to the
parent as equity capital and the rest, W0 − Ep, is invested in riskless assets earning a rate
of return, re. Thus, the end-of-period wealth of the shareholders can be written as
W˜ = Y˜p + (1 + re)(W0 −Ep). (6)
The after-tax cost of domestic currency denominated debt is given by (1 − tp)rp. The
after-tax cost of foreign currency denominated debt, on the other hand, consists of two
components. The first component is (1 − ts)rs, which is due to the interest cost. The
second component arises from the fact that the after-tax value of one dollar of dividend
repatriations is only δ, implying that 1 − δ serves as an effective tax rate on dividend
remittances. Inspection of equation (4) reveals a saving of (1− δ)[1 + (1− ts)rs] on these
taxes per dollar of foreign currency denominated debt. Thus, the after-tax cost of foreign
currency denominated debt, which is the sum of these two components, can be written as
δ(1−ts)rs−(1−δ). The global weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of the multinational
firm, rk, is therefore defined by
rk = (1− tp)rpDp
K
+ [δ(1− ts)rs − (1− δ)]e0Ds
K
+ re
Ep
K
. (7)
The multinational firm possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U(W ),
defined over the date 1 wealth of its shareholders, W , with U ′(W ) > 0 and U ′′(W ) < 0,
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indicating the presence of risk aversion. The international capital structure of the multina-
tional firm is a quadruple, (Dp, Ds, Ep, Es), that, using equations (1) and (2), reduces to a
pair, (Dp, Ds). Substituting equations (3), (4), (5), and (7) into equation (6) yields
W˜ = (1− tp)[Xp + (e0 − e˜1)H ] + δ(1− ts)e˜1Xs − (1 + rk)K
+δ(e0 − e˜1)[1 + (1− ts)rs]Ds + (1 + re)W0. (8)
The decision problem of the multinational firm is to choose an international capital struc-
ture, (Dp, Ds), and a position in the currency forward market, H , so as to maximize the
expected utility of the date 1 wealth of its shareholders:
max
Dp,Ds,H
E[U(W˜)], (9)
where E(·) is the expectation operator and W˜ is defined in equation (8).
2. Optimal currency forward hedging
To facilitate the analysis, we reformulate problem (9) as a two-stage optimization problem.
In the first stage, we derive the hedging demand:
H(Dp, Ds) = argmax
H
E[U(W˜ )], (10)
for any given international capital structure, (Dp, Ds). Based on equation (10), we define
the indirect expected utility, V (Dp, Ds), as E[U(W˜ )] evaluated at H(Dp, Ds). In the second
stage, we derive the optimal international capital structure:
(D∗p, D
∗
s) = arg max
(Dp,Ds)
V (Dp, Ds). (11)
Substituting equation (11) into equation (10) yields the optimal forward position, H∗ =
H(D∗p, D∗s), which completes the solution to problem (9).
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Using equation (10), H(Dp, Ds) is defined by the following first-order condition:
E[U ′(W˜ )(e0 − e˜1)](1− tp) = 0. (12)
The second-order condition is satisfied trivially given risk aversion. Using the covariance
operator, Cov(·, ·), equation (12) can be written as5
E[U ′(W˜ )][e0 − E(e˜1)] = Cov[U ′(W˜ ), e˜1]. (13)
Since the currency forward market is unbiased in that e0 = E(e˜1), equation (13) reduces to
Cov[U ′(W˜ ), e˜1] = 0. (14)
Based on equation (14), we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the presence of the unbiased currency forward market, the hedging
demand is H(Dp, Ds) is given by
H(Dp, Ds) =
δ
1− tp {(1− ts)Xs − [1 + (1− ts)rs]Ds}, (15)
for any given international capital structure, (Dp, Ds).
Proof: Rewrite equation (8) as
W˜ = (1− tp)Xp + δ(1− ts)e0Xs − (1 + rk)K + (1 + re)W0
+(e0 − e˜1){(1− tp)H + δ[1 + (1− ts)rs]Ds − δ(1− ts)Xs}. (16)
Inspection of equations (14) and (16) reveals equation (15). 2
Proposition 1 implies that the optimal position of the multinational firm in the unbiased
currency forward market is a full-hedge that completely removes its exchange rate risk ex-
posure. This result is analogous to the celebrated full-hedging theorem derived by Danthine
5For any two random variables, x˜ and y˜, Cov(x˜, y˜) = E(x˜y˜)− E(x˜)E(y˜).
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(1978), Holthausen (1979), Katz and Paroush (1979), Broll and Zilcha (1992), Broll and
Wong (1999), Broll, Wong, and Zilcha (1999), among others, in the hedging literature. The
intuition underlying Proposition 1 is that the unbiased currency forward market essentially
provides the multinational firm ‘insurance’ at actuarial terms, rendering full hedging by the
firm optimal.
3. Optimal international capital structure
Now, we are ready to fully solve problem (9). It follows from Proposition 1 that no residual
exchange rate risk remains. Thus, the second-stage optimization problem reduces to
max
Dp, Ds
U [(1− tp)Xp + δ(1− ts)e0Xs − (1 + rk)K + (1 + re)W0]. (17)
Since only the global WACC, rk, in the objective function of program (17) depends on Dp
and Ds, the following proposition is immediately invoked.6
Proposition 2. In the presence of the unbiased currency forward market, the optimal
international capital structure of the multinational firm minimizes the global WACC.
Proposition 2 implies that the optimal international capital structure of the multina-
tional firm depends neither on its risk attitude nor on the incidence of the exchange rate
uncertainty. This result is analogous to the celebrated separation theorem derived by Dan-
thine (1978), Holthausen (1979), Katz and Paroush (1979), Broll and Zilcha (1992), Broll,
Wong, and Zilcha (1999), among others, in the hedging literature. To see the intuition,
inspection of equation (16) reveals that the exchange rate risk exposure of the multina-
tional firm is entirely controlled by its forward position in the currency forward market
and is totally unrelated to its international capital structure decision, thereby yielding the
separation result.
6It is straightforward, albeit tedious, to show that the second-order conditions for a minimum are satisfied
given the assumed properties of rp and rs.
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4. The effect of hedging on international capital structure
In this section, we want to examine the implications of exchange rate risk management on
the international capital structure decision and on the currency of denomination decision.
It is of interest to see what role the currency forward market plays in the behavior of the
multinational firm. To this end, we write the date 1 exchange rate as e˜1 = e0 + γz˜, where
γ is a parameter taking a value of unity and z˜ is a zero-mean random variable.
If the currency forward market is either absent or not accessible by the multinational
firm, the decision problem of the firm becomes
max
Dp,Ds
E[U(W˜ )] s.t. H ≡ 0, (18)
where W˜ is defined in equation (8). The first-order conditions of problem (18) are given by
E[U ′(W˜ )]
(
− ∂rk
∂Dp
K
)
= 0, (19)
E
{
U ′(W˜ )
{
− ∂rk
∂Ds
K − δγz˜
[
1 + (1− ts)
(
rs + r′s
∂λs
∂Ds
Ds
)]}}
= 0, (20)
The second-order conditions of problem (18) are satisfied given risk aversion and the as-
sumed properties of rp and rs.
Let (D0p, D0s) be the optimal international capital structure in this case (i.e., γ = 1).
Using Propositions 1 and 2, we know that the solution of problem (18) would have been
(D∗p, D∗s) had γ equaled zero. Hence, to compare (D∗p, D∗s) and (D0p, D0s), we can simply
conduct the comparative static exercise with respect to the shift parameter, γ. According
to Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964), we can define a measure of absolute risk aversion of the
multinational firm as R(W ) = −U ′′(W )/U ′(W ) for any given W . We state the following
proposition where a proof can be found in Appendix.
Proposition 3. If the preference of the multinational firm exhibits CARA or DARA, then
the introduction of the unbiased currency forward market induces the firm to issue more
domestic currency denominated debt and less foreign currency denominated debt.
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Proof: See Appendix. 2
Proposition 3 is a rather intuitive result. When the currency forward market is not
accessible to the multinational firm, the only alternative to such a direct hedging is a
money market hedge via issuing more foreign currency denominated debt and less domestic
currency denominated debt. It follows immediately from Proposition 1 that the global
WACC has to be distorted in a way that it exceeds the minimum attainable level in the
presence of the unbiased currency forward market.
Elliott, Huffman, and Makar (2003) document that foreign currency denominated debt
and foreign currency derivatives appear to be substitutes in hedging foreign currency risk
for US multinational corporations. This finding is further confirmed by Nguyen and Faff
(2004) using a sample of Australian firms. Proposition 3 thus offers a theoretical rationale
for these empirical findings.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the interaction between the financing and hedging decisions of a
multinational firm facing exchange rate uncertainty. The results have shown how exchange
rate movements, multiple tax jurisdictions, segmented capital markets, and currency for-
ward markets jointly determine the optimal international capital structure and the best mix
of currencies. If the multinational firm has access to an unbiased currency forward market,
we have shown that the firm will choose its international capital structure to minimize the
global weighted average cost of capital (WACC). In contrast, if the firm has no access to
the currency forward market, we have shown that the firm has to rely on a money mar-
ket hedge via issuing more foreign currency denominated debt and less domestic currency
denominated debt, resulting in a distorted global WACC that exceeds the minimum level.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3: We write the first-order conditions, equations (19) and (20), as
Vp = −E[U ′(W˜ )] ∂rk
∂Dp
K = 0, (A.1)
Vs = −E[U ′(W˜ )M˜ ] = 0, (A.2)
where
M˜ =
∂rk
∂Ds
K + δγz˜
[
1 + (1− ts)
(
rs + r′s
∂λs
∂Ds
Ds
)]
. (A.3)
The second-order conditions of problem (18) require that Vpp < 0, Vss < 0, and VppVss −
V 2ps > 0, where
Vpp = −E[U ′(W˜ )]∂
2rk
∂D2p
K, (A.4)
Vss = E[U ′′(W˜ )M˜2]− E
[
U ′(W˜ )
∂M˜
∂Ds
]
, (A.5)
Vps = −E[U ′(W˜ )] ∂
2rk
∂Dp∂Ds
K. (A.6)
Given the assumed properties of rp and rs, it is easily verified that ∂2rk/∂Dp∂Ds > 0 and
thereby Vps < 0.
We totally differentiate equations (A.1) and (A.2) with respect to γ and apply Cramer’s
rule to yield
dDp
dγ
=
VsγVps − VpγVss
VppVss − V 2ps
,
dDs
dγ
=
VpγVps − VsγVpp
VppVss − V 2ps
,
where Vpγ = 0 and
Vsγ = −E[U ′(W˜ )z˜]δ
[
1 + (1− ts)
(
rs + r′s
∂λs
∂Ds
Ds
)]
− E[U ′′(W˜ )M˜z˜]δYs. (A.7)
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Since Vpp < 0, Vps < 0, and VppVss − V 2ps > 0, the sign of dDp/dγ will be opposite to that
of Vsγ while the sign of dDs/dγ will be the same as that of Vsγ .
Note that E[U ′(W˜ )z˜] = Cov[U ′(W˜ ), z˜] < 0 since ∂U ′(W )/∂z = U ′′(W )δγYs < 0 under
risk aversion. Thus, the first term in the right-hand side of equation (A.7) is positive. Using
equation (A.3), we can write the second term in the right-hand side of equation (A.7) as
Ys
γ
[
1 + (1− ts)
(
rs + r′s
∂λs
∂Ds
Ds
)]{E[U ′′(W˜ )M˜ ] ∂rk
∂Ds
K − E[U ′′(W˜ )M˜2]
}
. (A.8)
The second term in the curly brackets of expression (A.8) is clearly positive under risk
aversion. If we can show that the first term is non-negative, then we can conclude that
Vsγ > 0. From equation (A.2) and the fact that E[U ′(W˜)z˜] < 0, we have ∂rk/∂Ds > 0.
Thus, the first term of expression (A.8) being non-negative is tantamount to E[U ′′(W˜ )M˜ ] ≥
0. Unfortunately, this term is a priori indeterminate without further restrictions on the
preference of the multinational firm.
Using the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, we have
E[U ′′(W˜ )M˜ ] = −E{[R(W˜)−R(Wˆ )]U ′(W˜ )M˜}, (A.9)
where we have used equation (A.2), and Wˆ is the realized wealth level at which M˜ equals
zero. If U exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), then R(W ) is invariant to W
so that equation (A.9) implies that E[U ′′(W˜ )M˜ ] = 0. On the other hand, if U exhibits
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), then R′(W ) < 0. Since both W˜ and M˜ are
increasing in z˜, the sign of R(W˜ ) − R(Wˆ ) must be opposite to that of M˜ under DARA.
From equation (A.9), we have E[U ′′(W˜ )M˜ ] > 0. 2
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